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CASE COMMENTS

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
PARING THE TAIL THAT WAGGED THE DOG
Milliken v. Bradley, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974)
Plaintiffs' brought suit against Michigan state officers and Detroit district
school officials2 alleging racial segregation within the Detroit school system in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 The
district court found de jure segregation within the Detroit public school system 4 and ordered the Detroit Board of Education to submit desegregation
plans. Additionally, the district court ordered the state to submit desegregation plans for the city of Detroit and the surrounding three-county metropolitan area despite the fact that the suburban school districts were not parties to
the action.5 Finding that desegregation of Detroit public schools could not be
accomplished witlin the corporate limits of the city,6 the district court ordered
the implementation of a metropolitan plan requiring interdistrict busing of
students to achieve racial balance.7 The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, af1. This action was brought by plaintiff black parents, the Detroit branch of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the representatives of a
class defined as all school children of the city of Detroit and all Detroit resident parents
having children of school age. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 584 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
2. Id. The named defendants included the Governor of Michigan, the attorney general
of Michigan, the state board of education, the state superintendent of public instruction, the
Board of Education of the City of Detroit, its members, and its former superintendent of
schools. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
3. Plaintiffs alleged that Act 48 of the 1970 Michigan Legislature interfered with the
execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation within
Detroit, known as the April 7, 1970, Plan. The district court refused to grant an injunction
restraining the implementation of Act 48. See 338 F. Supp. at 584-85. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held Act 48 unconstitutional because it inhibited desegregation, and remanded the
case for trial. Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1970). The district court, without an evidentiary hearing, refused to accept the April 7, 1970, Plan. Instead, the court approved an alternative plan submitted by the Detroit District School Board. 338 F. Supp. at
584. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion
in refusing to adopt the April 7 Plan without an evidentiary hearing and remanded for
immediate trial on the merits. 438 F.2d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1971).
4. The district court found that "[g]overnmental action and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local," had combined to establish and maintain racial segregation within the
Detroit School District, which is coterminous with the municipal limits of the City of
Detroit. 338 F. Supp. at 587.
5. The 1970 census found the population of Michigan to be 8,875,083, almost half of
which, 4,199,931, resided in the tri-county area of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. See 94
S. Ct. 3112, 3120 n.10 (1974). Detroit is located in Wayne County. See Bradley v. Milliken,
468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972), dismissing an appeal by the defendants of the district order requiring submission of metropolitan desegregation plans.
6. The district court's ruling on the "Detroit-only" desegregation plan is set out in full
by the court of appeals. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1973). The Detroit Board of Education and counsel for white parents within the city of Detroit, defendants
to the action, also argued that a metropolitan plan was the only method of effectively desegregating Detroit. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 922 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
7. 345 F. Supp. 914. The district court stated: "It should be noted that the court has
taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school
districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether, with
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firmed s and remanded so that all affected suburban districts could be heard on
the scope and implementation of an interdistrict remedy. 9 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, without a substantial,
interdistrict constitutional violation, remedies crossing traditional school district boundaries exceeded the equitable jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. 10
Since the decision of Brown v. Board of Education" one of the most troublesome aspects of constitutional law has been the implementation of desegregation in the nation's public schools. 1- In Green v. County School Board's the
Supreme Court held that each state had an "affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary school system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch" and to develop a plan
that "promises realistically to work now." 4 The courts, in effecting the Green
mandate, eventually turned to mandatory busing of school children to dismantle de jure segregated school systems.15 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education16 the Supreme Court approved this expansion of the
remedial equity powers set forth in the second Brown decision.'1
the exclusion of the City of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts
of de jure segregation." Id. at 920. Additionally, the district court ordered the purchase of
295 buses in order to effect the plan. 484 F.2d at 221.
8. 484 F.2d 215. The court en banc reached the same conclusion as the vacated opinion
of a Sixth Circuit panel filed Dec. 8, 1972. Id. at 218-19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of de jure segregation within the Detroit school system, agreed with the
district court that the "Detroit-only" plan would not rectify these violations, and concluded
that because the only feasible desegregation plans involved the crossing of school district
boundaries, an interdistrict remedy was within the equitable power of the court. Id. at
249-50.
9. The terms of the remand did not require the district court to accept evidence on the
substantive merits of the propriety of a "Detroit-only" plan or whether suburban districts
had committed constitutional violations. The court of appeals also vacated the district
court's order to purchase buses until an "appropriate time." Id. at 252.
10. 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring separately; White, J., with whom
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined, dissenting; Marshall, J., with whom Douglas,
Brennan, and White, JJ., joined, dissenting; Douglas, J., dissenting separately).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. In Brown (II), Brown (I)'s implementation decision, the Court discussed the equitable
remedies available to federal courts in implementing desegregation. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
The central issue following Brown (I) was whether the Constitution required affirmative desegregation. Dicta in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), stated: "Nothing in
the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court (Brown I) takes away from the
people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does
not require integration." Id. at 777. This notion was rejected in United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966) and in Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th
Cir. 1965).
13. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
14. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original). Accord, Carter v. West Feleceana School Bd., 396
U.S. 290 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969); Monroe
v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
15. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 44-46 (1971).
16. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Accord, Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
17. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). See note 12 supra. Swann offered
three principal remedies for segregation: (1) racial quotas, (2) remedial altering of attendance zones, and (3) transportation of students. 402 U.S. at 22-32. In Swann the Court
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The dichotomy of de jure and de facto segretation, however, complicated
the application of this remedy.'s In Spencer v. Kugler 9 the court relied heavily
on Swann in concluding that the federal judiciary was without equitable
jurisdiction to remedy racial imbalance in schools that resulted from purely
de facto segregation. 20 Yet the Supreme Court, when faced with both de jure
and. de facto segregation occuring within the city of Denver School District, 21
affirmed-a city-wide desegregation plan -that included extensive busing. 22 The
Court held that substantial de jure segregation within school district boundaries created a presumption that de jure intent permeated the entire district
and shifted the burden of proving the constitutionality of any "de facto"
.racially identifiable schools onto the school district authorities.23
stated: "[As"with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy. In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable rem.edies a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school
system." Id. at 16. "Once a right and a violation'have been shown, the scope of a district
leourt's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are in:lierent-in- equitable ,remedies." -Id. at 15. "The-remedy -for-such [de jure] segregation may be
administratively awkward, inconvenient and even bizarre in some situations and may impose
'burdeis'on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided .
when" remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate the dual school systems.". Id. at 28. In Davis
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (i971), the Court said: "Having once found a
violation, the district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation taking into account the practicalities of the
situation. The measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness." Id. at 37.
18. The court in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) defined "de-jure
segregation" as "segregation specifically mandated by law or by public policy pursued under
color of law," and "de facto segregation" as segregation that "results from the action of
pupil assignment policies not based on race but upon social or other conditions for'which
government cannot be held responsible." Id. at 493. The Supreme Court has recently defined "de jure segregation" as the purpose or intent to segregate. Keyes v. School.Dist. No.
1, 413.U.S. 189, 208 (1973). See generally Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275 (1972).
- ..
.
..
19.. 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), afJ'd, 404 U.S. 1027. (1972).
20. '326 F. Supp. at 1242. See qtso Bell y. School City of Gary, 324.F.2d 209 (1963); Hob'son v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967). In Spencer, plaintiffs alleged that racial segregation
- was due to school district lines drawn in 1953. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of de jure
action and apparently relied on the existence of racially imbalanced schools as a prima fade
case of constitutional violation. The court noted- -"A- continuing trend towards racial imbalance caused by housing patterns within the various school districts is not susceptible to
federal judicial intervention. The New Jersey Legislature has by intent maintained a unitary
system of public education, albeit that system has degenerated to extreme racial imbalance in
some school districts... " 326 F. Supp. at 1243. Further, Swann contained substantial dicta
concerning de facto segregation and interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§2000c-6(a) (Slupp. IT,1972) not to include de facto segregation under federal remedial
authority. 402 U.S. at 17-18.
21. The Tenth Circuit found de jure acts within.the Park Hill section of Denver. Racial
separation in other portions of the city, however, seemed due to de facto causes. Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1;445 F.2d 990, 1002, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1971).
22. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
. 23. Keyes can be reconciled with Swann and Spencer by noting that the Keyes Court
-presumed district-wide de jure segregation. 413 U.S. at 208. Because school authorities did
not rebut the presumption,-Keyes became another de jure case justifying the use of broad
equitable powers available to the federal judiciary. See generally Note, De Facto School
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Thus, prior to the instant decision the Court used broad language to define the equity powers available to federal courts in equal protection cases and
specifically approved busing as a remedy for de jure segregation. In the de
facto segregation context, however, the Court refused to permit these broad
remedies. Yet when segregation was due to de jure and de facto causes, the
Court would presume the racial imbalance totally de jure and amenable to
remedy, if the de jure segregation was substantial and within a single school
district.
Like Denver, many modern metropolitan areas without a history of overt
de jure segregation nevertheless exhibit geographic separation along racial
lines due to income differences. The principal example of such income polarization is urban-suburban segregation.24 Previously, federal courts had found
two types of constitutional violations justifying multidistrict remedies: drawing or redrawing of school district lines, 25 and the transfer of school units between school districts. 2G Nevertheless, the question remained whether an
equitable desegregation remedy, in the absence of de jure violations, could
reach into suburban school districts in order to rectify the racial imbalance in
metropolitan schools.
The Supreme Court faced just such an interdistrict remedy problem in
Bradley v. School Board.27 The Fourth Circuit had rejected a multidistrict
busing plan in Richmond, Virginia because the defendants had satisfactorily
complied with federal desegregation guidelines, 28 on the apparent reasoning
that without a wrong there could be no remedy.209 The Supreme Court divided
evenly on the merits, thus permitting the Fourth Circuit's decision to stand,
but leaving the issue of multidistrict desegregation remedies unresolved. 30
The instant case, which involved a metropolitan, multidistrict remedy,
Segregation and the "State Action" Requirement: A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND. L.J.
304 (1973); Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Schoolhouse Door, 9
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. L. REV. 124 (1974).
24. In 1960, 100 of )etroit',, 251 schools were 90% or more white and 71 were 90% or
more Negro. In 1970, of Detroit's 282 schools, 69 were 90% or more white and 133 were
90% or more Negro. 94 S. Ct. at 3154. The district court noted in its analysis of Detroit's
racial polarization that "[i]f the population trends evidenced in the federal decennial census
for the years 1940 through 1970 continue ....
[t]he percentage of black students in the
Detroit Public Schools in 1975-76 will be 72.0%, in 1980-81 will be 80.7% and in 1992 it will
be virtually 100% .... " 338 F. Supp. at 585.
25. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1969); cf. United States v.
Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407
U.S. 451 (1972).
26. United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1971); Turner v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
27. 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
28. 462 F.2d 1058, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972).
29. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
30. The Richmond case involved school districts previously guilty of de jure violation
and currently utilizing those methods outlined in Swann to achieve unitary school systems.
Because they complied with federal guidelines, the issue then became de facto urban-suburban racial polarization not subject to federal intervention. The court of appeals noted the
independent, local nature of Virginia's school districts and found that no concerted state
intervention existed. 462 F.2d at 1067.
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proposed in response to combined de facto-de jure segregation,3 1 again presented this issue to the Court. The majority believed the pivotal question to
be the extent of a federal court's equitable jurisdiction once a constitutional
violation had occurred. As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his concurring opinion: "In the present posture of the case, therefore, the Court does not deal
with questions of substantive constitutional law. The basic issue now before
the Court concerns, rather, the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction."'3 2 Noting that redistricting and interdistrict transfer of school units are
de jure actions sufficient to trigger a cross-district remedy,33 the majority
stated "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of state or local
school districts, or of a single school district haste been a substantial cause of
the inter-district segregation."3 4
By joining state officials, plaintiffs sought to distinguish Richmond on the
ground that Michigan participates more directly than Virginia in school district affairs. The district court utilized this "state action"35 as partial justification for its use of a metropolitan perspective in shaping its remedy.30 The
court also felt compelled to reject a "Detroit-only" remedy because it would
not fulfill the mandates of Green3 7 and Davis38 to eliminate racial segregation
"root and branch" and to measure desegregation plans by their "effectiveness."391 Additionally, the district court found that a multidistrict busing
31.
32.
33.
34.

See note 8 supra.
94 S. Ct. 3112, 3131 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 3127, 3132.
Id. at 3127. The majority limited interdistrict remedies to interdistrict violations by

school authorities. Id. Chief Justice Burger, in Swann, remarked: "One vehicle can carry
only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objectives of Brown (I)
402 U.S. 1,
to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope .
22 (1971). But see Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in the instant case, which appears to sanction cross-district remedies for "purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state
housing or zoning laws." 94 S. Ct. at 3132.
35. 484 F.2d at 238. See also 94 S. Ct. at 3149-53 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Note, Segregative Intent and the Single Governmental Entity in School Desegregation, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1111;
Note, Consolidation for Desegregation: The Unresolved Issue of the Inevitable Sequel, 82
YALE L.J. 1681 (1973). See note 2 supra.

36. The district court, in expanding the scope of its equitable jurisdiction to include
suburban districts, seemed to be wrestling with several of the same problems faced by the
Supreme Court in Keyes. See 345 F. Supp. 914, 921 (1972). Extrapolation of the Court's
reasoning in Keyes to a metropolitan area would be consistent with past Court holdings. Cf.
notes 20, 23 supra. By using a metropolitan perspective, de jure segregation within the city
of Detroit would compare with the de jure segregation found by the Court in the Park Hill
section of Denver. Keyes v. School Bd., No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973). The substantial de
jure segregation within Detroit would then shift the burden of proof onto the state to
demonstrate that racially identifiable schools within the Detroit metropolitan area were due
to de facto causes. If.the state successfully rebuts this presumption of de jure segregation,
federal courts would have no authority to act. See text accompanying note 20 supra. Should
the state fail to overcome this burden, however, any racially identifiable schools would be
presumed de jure and recognized remedies for de jure segregation would become appropriate.
See Commentsupra note 23, at 135-42; cf, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
37. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
38. 402 US. 33 (1971).
39. See 484 F.2d at 242-45, wherein the district court opinion on the "Detroit-only" plan

is set out in full. See also text accompanying note 14 supra. This argument is premised upon
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remedy would involve comparable travel times and would require the purchase of fewer buses than a "Detroit-only" desegregation plan.40 Speaking for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that "desegregation, in the sense of
dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial balance
in each 'school, grade or classroom.' "41 "[T]he scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the Constitutional violation." 42 It seems
the Court interpreted Swann to adopt a "sliding scale" analysis of federal
remedial authority in public school desegregation, which, as demonstrated by
the instant case, can contract as well as expand.
The instant Court's dilemma in evaluating the validity of extensive busing
remedies was foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Black's question during the oral
argument of Swann: "How can you rearrange the whole country?" 43 The instant Court indicated that with extensive multidistrict busing as the remedy
for de jure intradistrict segregation, the remedial tail had begun to wag the
substantive dog. Apparently, the tail was bobbed at traditional school district
lines.
Of course, state and local school district authorities are not precluded from
voluntarily correcting de facto racial imbalance by fashioning interdistrict
desegregation plans.4 4 Congress, however, has repeatedly demonstrated an
aversion to busing as a means of achieving racial balance, 4 and the executive
the view that the purpose of integration is to equalize opportunities for all races. Under this
reasoning there is no de facto-dc jure dichotomy inhibiting the dismantlement of racially
segregated schools. See generally Goodman, supra note 18. Mr. Justice Powell wrote an exhaustive partial concurrence in Keyes propounding the demise of a de jure-de facto distinction. He would not define "de jure" as state intent to segregate; rather, if the effect is segregation the burden is placed upon the state to show a pure de facto causation. Mr. Justice
Powell believed this would give a national interpretation to the fourteenth amendment.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973). See also Comment, supra note 23, at
143-48. Several commentators have discussed this "effect vs. intent" test. Id. at 145 n.89.
40. The "Detroit-only" plan would have required an estimated 900 buses in order to
dismantle the existing dual school system because Detroit relies largely on public transportation at student expense for those students living beyond walking distance from school. The
suburban tri-county area had arm inventory of 1,800 buses. Considering more efficient utilization, the district court found only 350 additional buses necessary to effectuate a metropolitan
plan. See the Supreme Court's discussion of this district court finding, 94 S.Ct. at 3160-61.
41. 94 S.Ct. at 3125.
42. Id. at 3127, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971).
43. "From the first case, I have been interested in plain discrimination on account of
race. We should correct that. But it disturbs me to hear we should try to change the whole
lives of people around the country. You're challenging the place people live. You want to
haul people miles and miles and miles in order to get an equal ratio in schools. It's a pretty
big job to assign to us, isn't it? How can you rearrange the whole country?" 39 U.S.L.W. 3159
(1970).
44. McDaniel v. Barresi, 401 U.S. 39, 42 (1971); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
509-10 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1967); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1971); Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971),
aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
45. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000c-6(a) (Supp. II, 1972); 20 U.S.C. §1656
(1970); Pub. L. No. 93-38 (Aug. 21, 1974), amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§236 et seq. (1970).
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branch is currently taking an anti-busing position.- Thus, it is unlikely that
significant voluntary action will be forthcoming.

Given the improbability of voluntary desegregation, the existence of an
effective remedy for a minority victimized by de facto segregation is doubtful.
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts are precluded from effecting

remedies triggered by purely de facto segregation.47 Further, the instant case
appears to signal a reversal in the expansion of federal equitable remedies in
response to de jure segregation. Consequently, the principal case will have an
immediate effect on those lower courts currently wrestling with the segregation

dilemmas created by urban-suburban racial polarization. 4s Where this polarization conforms to school district boundaries, interdistrict de jure segregation

will have to be alleged and proved to justify an interdistrict remedy.49
In response to this apparent absence of remedy for de facto segregated minorities, Mr. Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated:
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee
of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In the
short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metro-

politan areas to be divided up each into two cities -one white, the
other black -but it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately
regret.50

Although the accuracy of this prediction may be questioned, Justice Marshall's
analysis reaches the underlying, volatile issues currently facing school desegregation.
By precluding the use of multidistrict remedies unless the involved school
districts participated in interdistrict de jure segregation, the present court has
redefined its mandate requiring the greatest degree of actual desegregation.5.
While desegregation plans are still to be measured by their effectiveness, the
46. See 32 CONG. Q. 2049 (1974). President Ford told the Senate Rules Committee on
Nov. 5, 1973, during his .Vice Presidential confirmation hearings, that if the federal courts
continued to use forced busing to achieve racial balance, he would favor a constitutional
amendment prohibiting busing. Id. at 2031.
47. Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). See
also Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1963); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
48. Pending suits seek interdistrict relief in the following cities: Hartford, Conn.; Louisiille, Ky.; Wilmington, Del.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Durham, N.C.; Atlanta, Ga.; Grand Rapids,
Mich.; Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Dayton, Ohio. 43 U.S.L.W. 3029 (1974). See Higgins v.
Board of Educ. of the City of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), wherein the court
noted: "In the recent decision of Milliken v. Bradley .

.

. the Supreme Court considered the

grounds for imposition of an inter-district remedy, and it concluded that there must be a
causal connection among the districts involved before inter-district relief could be employed ....
We conclude that there has been no showing of a constitutional violation of
any kind in the outlying districts and that a metropolitan remedy would therefore be completely inappropriate under the standards'of Milliken." Id. at 796-97.
49.

Id. See note 53 infra.

50. 94 S. Ct. at 3161.
51. See note 17 supra.

,
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holding of the principal case constitutes an important limitation on the power
of the federal judiciary in drawing such plans.5 2- In order to effect multidistrict
remedies in urban-suburban racially polarized metropolitan areas, the separation will have to be demonstrably de jure and, perhaps more importantly, the
burden of proving such violations rests with the minority.53 Even when faced
with overt, de jure segregation and state responsibility,54 the federal judiciary
must now recognize that the nature of the violation will determine the scope
of the remedy is a term of art, a sliding scale contracted, requiring interdistrict
de jure segregation before remedies may cross traditional school district lines. 55
WILLIAM

A.

WEBER

52. Mr. Justice Marshall noted: "After 20 years of small, often difficult steps toward that
great end [making a 'living truth' of our Constitutional ideal of equal justice under law],
the Court today takes a giant step backwards." 94 S. Ct. at 3145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. See 94 S. Ct. at 3112, 3127, 3130, 3132. The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Higgins,
rendered after the instant case, held that "plaintiffs have not introduced convincing evidence
to support a finding that the State of Michigan contributed to and is responsible for any act
of de jure segregation in Grand Rapids." 508 F.2d 779, 796 (6th Cir. 1974). But cf. Ke)es v.
School Bd. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). See also Note, supra note 23.
54. In the instant case the majority accepted arguendo that the State of Michigan did
participate in establishment of the de jure segregated Detroit school system and acknowledged that several instances of cross-district de jure segregation had occurred. 94 S. Ct. at
3129-30. The Court, nevertheless, refused to sanction massive interdistrict busing to relieve all
of Detroit's intradistrict de jure segregation. 94 S. Ct. at 3112.
55. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), a
per curiam decision in which the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its previous decision allowing an
interdistrict remedy. In Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.
1973), the district court's dismissal of the action as to outlying school districts was reversed.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the reversal and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the instant case. 94 S. Ct. at 3208-09. In its reconsideration of the action,
the Sixth Circuit noted six "material and controlling distinctions" between Newburg and the
present case: (1) A "vital distinction" emphasized that in the present case there was no
evidence that outlying districts had committed acts of de jure segregation; exactly the opposite was true in Newburg. (2) In the present case a metropolitan remedy would have involved 53 school districts in three counties; in Newburg only two or possibly three districts
within a single county are involved. (3) In Kentucky the state legislature has referred to
school district boundaries as "artificially drawn school district lines." Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN.
§160.048(1) (Baldwin 1969); the Michigan Legislature has made no such reference. (4) In the
present case the Court noted concern over the administration of a large, metropolitan school
district. In Kentucky the reconsolidation of school districts within a single county is currently authorized by Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §160.041 (Baldwin 1969). (5) The City of Louisville School District is not coterminous with the City of Louisville; therefore, many students
living within the City of Louisville must attend Jefferson County schools, aggravating the
disestablishment of the dual city school system. (6) The "crucial difference" noted was that
school district lines in Kentucky have previously been ignored for the purpose of aiding and
implementing continued segregation in the two largest of the three affected school districts;
whereas in the present case, crossing of district lines occurred in only two of fifty-three affected districts. 510 F.2d at 1359-61. The Sixth Circuit concluded from these facts that they
were "not confronted . . . with the problem in Milliken in which the remedy approved . . .
was broader than the constitutional violation." 510 F.2d at 1361.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/16

8

